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At the outset of the book, Echeverría characterizes the “technoscientific revolution” as
the unfolding in the twentieth century of two others revolutions that are constitutive of
modernity: the scientific revolution of seventeenth century, and the second industrial
revolution of the mid-nineteenth century. According to him, however, unlike the sci-
entific revolution, the technoscientific revolution, is neither an epistemological nor a
methodological revolution, but what he calls a “praxiological revolution”: a profound
transformation of the structure of scientific practice and of the values that shape sci-
ence and technology (p. 12).
1 Seven thesis concerning technoscience
Echeverría proposes the following theses, which I state summarily, to articulate the
principal aspects and consequences of the “praxiological revolution”.
(1) During the twentieth century, especially from the Second World War
on, a new way of practicing science has come into being and developed rap-
idly, first as “big science” and, more recently, as “technoscience” (p. 15).
(2) This development – a technoscientific revolution “or better, techno-
scientific revolutions, because they are produced in almost all scientific
disciplines, although in different ways in each one” (p. 15) – is the con-
temporary analogue of the seventeenth century scientific revolution.
(3) The technoscientific revolution is one of the main motors of a deeper
social and economic change, the “informational revolution” – the analogue
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of the industrial revolution. Just as science was vital for the development
of industrial society, so technoscience is a basic component of the emerg-
ing informational society, which brings with it the replacement of the mod-
ern notion of “industrial, scientific and technological development” by the
contemporary one of “technoscientific and informational development”.
(4) Since earlier studies of science and technology (historical, philosophi-
cal, sociological, political, cultural, anthropological, economical etc.) are
unable to confront the challenge imposed by the technoscientific revolu-
tion (p. 15), they need to be replaced by the studies on technoscience that
have a trans-disciplinary character.
(5) Philosophy of science and technology should be concerned with the
philosophical analysis (i.e., evaluation) of technoscientific activity, and
the changes in this activity. In this way, it becomes aligned with scientific
and technological policies, a component of technoscience, that originated
in Vannevar Bush’s report (1945) to President Roosevelt.
(6) The traditional questions of philosophy of science, related with justi-
fication, objectivity, and rationality of scientific knowledge, are completely
inadequate for dealing with “the foundations of technoscience” – a prob-
lem that “happens to be more important” needs to be added, “the evalua-
tion of scientific practice” (p. 16).
(7) “The thesis of axiological pluralism of technoscience” – it “presup-
poses on-going axiological conflicts in technoscientific activity” (p. 16),
and opposes the positivistic thesis of axiological neutrality and the thesis
that restricts values in science to epistemic or internal ones; and it is is
combined with the claim: “Axiology provides a powerful instrument of
analysis that integrates, in a single conceptual system, the various tools
used today to evaluate technoscientific actions and its results” (p. 16),
where these tools include: (a) “evaluation matrixes”, and “quotas or evalu-
ation limits”, and (b) the indices of science and technology, statistically
determined, that can be used to establish evaluation protocols “that are
used in current technoscientific practice”.
The bulk of the review will leave aside other issues, and devote itself to discussion and
criticism of these seven theses. Before proceeding, however, I will make a brief
comment on the third chapter that aims to justify the title of the book by making an
analogy with Thomas Kuhn’s analysis of scientific revolutions. In order to suggest that
technoscience corresponds to a deep “Kuhnian” transformation in scientific practice,
Echeverría feels obliged to employ concepts such as “technoscientific paradigm”; to
153
Get ready for technoscience: the constant burden of evaluation and domination
scientiæ zudia, São Paulo, v. 10, special issue, p. 151-62, 2012
discuss its components (e.g., symbolic generalizations, models, values, and exemplars);
to explore what the counterparts in technoscience of Kuhnian incommensurability
might be; and finally to introduce the question (to me, completely wrongheaded) of
the existence of technoscientific communities, and of “the conversion of scientific
communities into technoscientific enterprises” (p. 193). It is a strained analogy, for
Kuhn was never concerned with the financing of scientific research, or with applied
science, but these are indispensable for understanding technoscience; and it is not
pursued beyond this chapter, suggesting that the author only wants to obtain a rhetori-
cal aura for his argument for a technoscientific revolution from association with Kuhn’s
widely acclaimed account of scientific revolutions.
2 Critical exposition of Echeverría’s arguments
for his seven thesis
I will now examine in some detail Echeverría’s theses about technoscience, in order to
assess critically his main argument about technoscientific activity.
2.1 Underestimating the experimental dimension of technoscience
Thesis (1) just affirms a general historical fact. Echeverría elaborates it in the first two
chapters, based on historical studies of science and technology and their relations with
industry in the USA (cf. Price, 1973; Smith, 1990; Dickson, 1988; and especially arti-
cles in Galison & Hevly, 1992). He maintains that technoscience originated in USA
during the twentieth century; that there are two forms of it: big militarized science,
and that practiced by the large private corporations; and that, broadly speaking, it de-
veloped in three stages. The first stage, 1940 – 1956, corresponds to the implantation
of “big science” generated by US public financing. During it, while the state and the
military predominated, as exemplified in the Manhattan Project for the construction
of the atomic bomb during Second World War, we also find the growth of new corpora-
tions that, for the sake of furthering their private economic interests, instituted their
own departments of research and development (R&D), as well as the strengthening of
corporations, such as Du Pont, that already functioned in this way. The second stage,
1966 – 1976, was a decade of crises and stagnation produced by Vietnam War, in which
there was growing criticism of militarized science. Finally, during the third stage, from
1976 on, the large globalized companies with their activities organized around R&D of
goods and services were created, followed by, from 2000 on, enterprises aiming at “in-
novation” through development of the so called “new technologies”.
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Although referring to the three stage development of technoscience in this way
may seem acceptable, the detail of the exposition has serious limitations. These derive
from the way in which, throughout the book, the author underestimates the impor-
tance of epistemology, methodology, history, and sociology (and from his predilection
for the entrepreneurial dimension of technoscientific activity). By downplaying epis-
temological and methodological considerations in his characterization of technoscience
in favor of “praxiological” ones, he is impeded from evaluating correctly the scientific
dimension of technoscience, and the role and function of experimentation, of the ex-
perimental method, and of instrumentation in “big science”. Echeverría minimizes
the role of experimental research that is conducted using the instruments, laborato-
ries and buildings of the institutions that support “big science”, and does not consider
the strictly scientific importance of the construction of the enormous experimental
apparatus (telescopes, microscopes, particles accelerators laboratories and industrial
plants) that are capable of generating knowledge at the frontiers of science. The upshot
is a distorted perspective that fails to grasp adequately the social place of the institu-
tions connected with experimental science. It also fails to evaluate correctly the place
that experimental science and technological instrumentation occupies in the produc-
tive system. In this way, Echeverría does not give due attention to instrumental reason
and to its actual social functioning; ironically, in so doing he makes the same mistake
that he accuses philosophers and historians of making. This illustrates that the author
seems to be more interested in developing a discourse about the importance of evalu-
ating technoscientific actions and activities, than in coming to comprehend them.
Echeverría long discussion (over a hundred pages) of both “big science” and
technoscience will now be summarized in order to show the preeminence that he gives
to evaluative policies and practices for technoscientific activity.
● Big science = public financing + integration of scientists and engineers +
aim to advance knowledge and efficiency of technological instrumenta-
tion in order to obtain economic and military power (p. 37-8) + industri-
alized + militarized + gives rise, first, to public technoscientific policies
and projects, and, later, to private ones + juridical agent/subject.
● Technoscience = private financing + integration of scientists and engi-
neers + aim to gain political control of economic and innovation development
(p. 77-81), or “the control and domination of nature and societies” (p. 90)1
1 Echeverría pays little attention to the question of control: he doesn’t seem to consider control as a value, or to per-
ceive its centrality in contemporary scientific and technological activities; and he uses “control” and “domination”
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+ entrepreneurial + for the market or war + private scientific and techno-
logical policies and projects + plural subject or plurality of agents.
2.2 The ubiquity of revolutions and the systematic illusion
Theses (2) and (3) form a unity and have to do with the supposedly revolutionary char-
acter of technoscience. Echeverría’s argument, however, is marred by a conceptual con-
fusion: he does not clearly distinguish the technological medium from the technolo-
gies that produce it, and from those that could come to be developed in virtue of the
configuration of this medium. Since, for him, technoscience corresponds “to a great
transformation in the structure of scientific activity”, it can be interpreted as “a revolu-
tion in the practice of science that is neither an epistemological, nor a methodological
revolution” (p. 149). Yet, in order to show the effective functioning of such a transfor-
mation in scientific practice, the author invariably has to come back to considerations
about scientific methodology, for this transformation consists basically in the introduc-
tion of informatics and of the method of simulation. In Echeverría’s own formulation:
the two main methodological axes of modern science were mathematics and the
experimental method. Informatics and simulations constitute the two great meth-
odological novelties of the twentieth century, whose irruption, development, and
consolidation mark the passage from science to technoscience from the point of
view of formal languages and methodology (p. 106)
From this perspective, technoscience is characterized by the use of technologies
of information (cf. p. 125), and by the production of models and simulations, that rep-
resent new forms of experimentation. Furthermore, informatics is accompanied by a
corresponding growth in control (control of nature, and also social control) by means
of automation in the functioning of the machines. Then, the author concludes that since
all the sciences employ informatics and conduct their researches in networks, and all
disciplines uses informational equipment and languages, “we may claim that in all sci-
ences there has been the emergence of technoscience” (p. 146-7). For Echeverría:
In the twenty first century, it will be necessary to distinguish between traditional
disciplines and their corresponding technosciences: techno-mathematics,
as synonymous. Moreover, he has an ambiguous attitude toward control: on the one hand, he affirms, “technoscience
continues to show itself highly efficient at the moment of transforming the world or of dominating nature” (p. 99);
but, on the other hand, “technoscience does not intend to dominate or to transform nature, but society” (p. 209).
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techno-logic, techno-astronomy, techno-physics, techno-chemistry, techno-
biology, techno-medicine, techno-geology, techno-economy, techno-sociology,
techno-psychology etc. (p. 160).
Following the argument where it appears to lead him, Echeverría goes on to af-
firm that, because “Greenpeace uses some of the new information and communica-
tion technologies (television, internet etc.) ... from our point of view, [it] is another
technoscientific agent, although it intervenes from outside of the science and tech-
nology system” (p. 85). On this way of looking at things, even this review is techno-
scientific, because it was written on a computer using a specific informational soft-
ware, and it will be assessable on the internet, and it intervenes from outside of the
system criticizing one of its ideologues.
Informatics is, indeed, an invariant component of all the systems of activities in
contemporary society and culture; it is the technical/technological medium in which
these activities are developed. But, it is important not to confound (or create an ambi-
guity between) two senses of the term “technoscience”: (i) a general sense, techno-
science as the informational and cybernetics medium in which we live, a medium that
expands the dominion of machines by means of informatics, automation, feedback
systems, regulation, control of objects and processes; and (ii) a narrower sense,
technoscience as the “technoscientific enterprise”. Echeverría confounds these senses,
and consequently he falls victim to an illusion – seeing technoscience where it is not.
Then, consistent with (ii), the author claims that “technosciences are not made
by the scientific communities, but by entities far more complex, the technoscientific
enterprises” (p. 156). In this sense, “technoscience” refers to the set of private enter-
prises, which aim to gain economic and (in some cases) even military power, and which
put R&D&I at the center of their entrepreneurial strategies. But, in this sense, this
review is not a technoscientific product, and Greenpeace is not a technoscientific agent
– recognizing this the illusion vanishes. Echeverría, however, because of his down-
playing of the sociological perspective, is effectively impeded from recognizing this
and, more generally, from dealing systematically with the view that technoscientific
activities are new forms of institutional organization that explore the productive and
services opportunities, which are made possible by the actual technological infrastruc-
ture. Fortunately the medium is less deterministic than Echeverría supposes it to be.
Not recognizing this, passing from illusion to delirium, he considers as revolutionary
the introduction of each technical object, “such as the railroad, the automobile, the
electrical domestics etc.” (p. 179). The cost of maintaining the ambiguity is high.
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In contrast, when we attend to the distinction between the technoscientific me-
dium and the technoscientific enterprise, we see that there is no revolution, no rup-
ture or sudden transformation, but the gradual and cumulative, albeit rapid, expan-
sion and consolidation of the electronic medium over the electrical one, which remains
in place as the base on which the dynamics of the changing medium unfold. What
Echeverría considers to be a technoscientific revolution in information is part of the
social process of consolidation of the machinist medium, based on information and
automatic processing, in which new possibilities for social, economic, political, and
cultural relations arise, as do new forms of exploitation of the productive sector of so-
ciety. Putting the ambiguity aside, we can see – without illusion – that the very exist-
ence of large globalized corporations, Echeverría’s “technoscientific enterprises”, is
made possible by the gradual development of the technological medium. One may use
the computers and software of technoscientific companies, and “be in the network”,
without engaging in technoscience; but it has become close to a necessity to be an em-
ployee in a technoscientific enterprise.
2.3 The importance of evaluation to the administration of technoscience
Thesis (4)-(6) also compose a unity. Their role in Echeverría’s argument, we will see,
is to legitimate the activity of evaluation, given its supposed importance to the entre-
preneurial policies and projects of science and technology, and to enable him to ap-
propriate the term, “philosophy of technoscience”, for use connected with the merely
statistic task of establishing Science & Technology indexes and indicators.
Thesis (4) has two parts: first, none of the traditional disciplines and specialties
that make up “studies on science and technology” are able to grasp the new phenomenon
of technoscience, supposedly brought about by a “technoscientific  revolution”, so that
now they have to give way to the “studies on technoscience”; second, these studies have
a trans-disciplinary character. Thesis (5) particularizes thesis (4) to the case of philoso-
phy, so that philosophy can be transformed into an instrument of the politics of science.
Thesis (6) completes the reduction of “the philosophical analysis of scientific activity”
to a mere technical activity (non-critical) of constantly evaluating “scientific practice”.
Remember that the author’s thesis concerning technoscientific revolutions, and
their ubiquity, was based on considering technoscience ambiguously: sometimes as
the technological medium, sometimes as an activity developed by private enterprises
of the productive sector of society. This ambiguity is also used for the purpose of in-
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From the premise that technoscientific enterprises can be characterized as those
that put R&D&I at the center of their entrepreneurial strategies, and a hypothesis that
rigidly associates epistemic values to research, technical values to development, and
economic values to innovation, Echeverría concludes that “the axiology of techno-
science always has to take into account, minimally, three systems of values: epistemic,
technical, and economic (p. 70, author’s italics). For him, innovation has economic
import; “innovation” means a “technological development designed to be launched
into the market” (p. 211). Echeverría affirms the primacy of economic values in tech-
noscience: “economic and entrepreneurial values penetrate technoscientific activity
through and through and integrate the axiological nucleus of technoscience’s investi-
gation and application ... technoscience is always guided by economic values” (p. 70).
Then, maintaining that D&I are “the entrepreneurial components of technoscientific
activity”, he emphasizes the importance of axiology, “which guides technoscienti-
fic actions and their evaluations ex ante and ex post”.
There are several problems with Echeverría’s argument. The first has to do with
the use of the term “system”, and his failure to address the issue of relations among the
three “systems” of values systematically. The author does not even raise the question
about the import of the primacy of economic values to the relations between the three
systems of values, much less show what it is. It is hard to figure out what role the term
“system” is intended to play – the treatment is not systematic; the term is vaguely em-
ployed; no functional, structural or formal relations among the three “systems” are
displayed. The language used gives the impression that the argument makes use of the
theory of systems and that it is aligned with this authoritative scientific trend. That is
misleading rhetoric.
The second problem has to do with the way in which the author uses concepts
such as “transdisciplinarity”, “interdisciplinarity”, and “multidisciplinarity” vaguely,
without precision and without attention to the context of application of the concepts.
He constantly confuses two levels: “studies on science and technology”; and science
and technology itself. This is a consequence of  Echeverría’s unjustified downplaying
of the sociological dimension that makes it difficult for him to make distinctions that
are important for comprehending the social functioning of technoscientific activity.
In particular, he cannot make use of the more adequate characterization of trans, in-
ter, or multidisciplinarity that derives from the sociology and history of institutions,
where they are considered as regimes of production and diffusion of science and tech-
nology that have certain institutional aspects. These aspects make it indispensable that
the question of the interaction between the scientific disciplines and specialties be
dealt with on the institutional level, at which there occur relations among universities,
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private companies, financial agencies, government officials, etc. The prevailing insti-
tutional regime makes possible the relations among individual agents that are needed
for collaborative activity to unfold. It may favor, induce, and sustain, for example, trans-
versal collaborative relations that are established by individuals, who come from dif-
ferent disciplines and specialties, so as to constitute a temporary research team to work
on some problem or application at the frontiers between them (cf. Shinn, 2008;
Marcovich & Shinn, 2012). Hence, the constitution of these teams does not depend
only on the interactions of the individual agents involved, but relations among them
are modulated, and in some cases, even regulated, by the institutions involved.
A final problem is that nowhere does Echeverría present the basics of what he
calls “studies on technoscience”. This, together with his failure to give clear content to
inter, multi or transdisciplinarity, only confirms the rhetorical tone of his discourse.
2.4 An interactionist theory of technoscientific action
Echeverría’s argument is based on the very simple idea that the subject – in the sense
of agent – of technoscience is a plural subject that has constantly conflicting values.
This is why we need to be guided by an axiology that will serve to evaluate technoscientific
activity. The argument is based on a broad analogy: “the structural complexity of sci-
entific activity reflects itself instantaneously as complexity of the technoscientific
agent” (p. 219). The agent of technoscience is not the Cartesian or Kantian individual
subject, but a plural subject, i.e., one composed by a plurality of agents. Now, since the
plural subject is not “autonomous and coherent” as the individual subject may be con-
sidered to be, it is more prone to conflicts of values. Such conflicts are considered to be
inherent to plural subjects, because, in the final analysis, agents act following their
own values, and these conflict with those of others agents. It is necessary, then, to
construct an axiology that can serve as an instrument to regulate the conflicts in order
to render the plural subject coherent. The thesis that conflicts of values are a structu-
ral component of technoscience – and hence the importance of axiology (a theory
of values) to technoscientific activity – depends, therefore, both on the idea of plural
agent and on the characterization of value. I will now discuss the basic notions of “agent”
and “value”.
First, consider the notion of “agent” that Echeverría uses to make sense of
his notion of “plural subject”. The system of science and technology, for example, is
composed of sectors that Echeverría identifies as “the political, the financial, the sci-
entific-technological [aren’t they two separate sectors?], the entrepreneurial, the mili-
tary, the juridical, the market, and society [!]”. In the system of technoscience, “pri-
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vate enterprises and financial bodies” are the predominant agents; however,  since “in
other sectors [of society] there may be different agents relevant to technoscience (...)”,
also “it would be necessary to analyze the structure of these agents in each country,
in each discipline (...)”. So far, leaving aside its dependence on tacit suppositions, the
argument is acceptable. But, the author goes on to conclude: “from our point of view, it
is fundamental to include society among the technoscientific agents, not only because
(...) the great majority of the actions are directed toward society, but also because soci-
ety is not passive with respect to technoscience” (p. 215). But are not the sectors so-
cial? Is not technoscience made possible by material conditions and socially provided
organization?
We can then enumerate the agents: enterprises, public and private financial in-
stitutions, military, and government agencies and officials; and we must, in order to
consider society as a technoscientific agent, charitably interpret “society” – a term used
by Echeverría in the general sense – to refer to civil organizations, such as NGOs, work-
ers unions, consumer associations etc. However, the agents he refers to as “integrated”
into the nucleus of technoscience, turn out not to be institutions, organizations or en-
terprises, but individuals: “financiers, entrepreneurs, managers, lawyers, scientists
and engineers” (p. 219) – so that the plural subject is composed of a plurality of indi-
vidual agents that act motivated (egoistically) by their own interests and values.
Technoscientific action is, then, conceived as being produced by the interaction
(synergy) established among individual agents, independently of the hierarchical re-
lations required for them to develop a project inside of a private enterprise. The fact
that individual agents engage in their activities inside of an agent of higher order, then,
has no repercussion in their actions, which are considered as resulting from the de-
liberative evaluations of individuals motivated by their own values. Remember that
Echeverría never indicates functional, structural or formal relations between systems
and subsystems or their component parts.
This is an interactionist theory of action that considers all agents as individuals
independently of their position in the enterprise hierarchy, and holds that action re-
sults from a process of constant deliberative evaluation, realized by these individuals
agents, considered as evaluators, each guided by its characteristic set of values. Fur-
thermore, they are stereotyped agents. Each agent is taken to hold a delimited and co-
herent system of values: the scientist only has scientific values, the engineer technical
values, the lawyer legal values, and the entrepreneur economic values. Echeverría does
not take into account that the agents live in society and, therefore, hold confused mix-
tures of values; that they are individuals who belong to a particular social environment,
who have acquired particular habits, who work in particular institutions or compa-
nies, who inevitably adopt political and religious positions, who have particular aes-
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thetic tastes, and who may adhere to a particular scientific or professional ethos;2 and
that they act following a set of habits and attitudes (not necessarily consciously) that
operate even when they are called upon to produce specialized judgments.
What are values for Echeverría; and how are they related with actions? Accord-
ing to him, “values are functions (in the Fregean sense) applied by evaluating agents to
the systems of scientific, technological and technoscientific actions” (p. 237). This
means, first, that values are conceived as exterior to the activity itself, because they are
applied from outside in the evaluation of action. Moreover, to each action, there are
only two possible attributions of value to an action, positive or negative value, as there
are two attributions of truth, true or false, to propositional functions; and Echeverría
adds: “it is important to keep in mind that values have contraries, negative values, and
that evaluative or axiological rationality is based on the rule of incrementing the de-
gree of satisfaction of positive values and of diminishing that of the negative values”
(p. 233-4).
There are many passages (e.g., p. 240, 248) that show that Echeverría does not
entertain, and apparently opposes, the idea that values are qualities that practices (ac-
tions) have in virtue of their aims, directions, consequences, and risks, and that may
manifest themselves in practices (actions) in greater or lesser degrees.  He opposes
the idea that values come to be embodied in individual agents because of habits ac-
quired by socialization, in the family, school, community etc. But if agents themselves
do not embody values (many of them tacitly acquired), and if their actions do not mani-
fest certain values in greater or lesser degrees, how are values connected with actions?
He answers this question by transforming every agent into an evaluating agent “a sci-
entist, an engineer, an entrepreneur, a business person, a general, a politician, a law-
yer, an ecologist, or a common man” (p. 248). Each one acts by attributing a positive or
negative value to certain actions or set of actions. According to this conception, the
consensual values must be intensively constructed from the interactions between dif-
ferent individual evaluative acts of scientists, engineers, entrepreneurs etc. involved.
Echeverría does not entertain that there may be preexisting consensus on values, which
modulates technoscientific actions, that are not the product of evaluative deliberation,
but are tacitly incorporated into the goals and regulations of the institutions or corpo-
rations in which the action unfolds.
2 Echeverría’s discussion of values in technoscientific activity omits any reference to the scientific ethos, discussed
by Robert K. Merton (1973 [1942]), and the recent sociological discussion motived by John Ziman (1994, 2000) on
the contemporary transformations of that ethos. I will not discuss the implications of this omission in this review.
See also Oliveira, 2011.
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All of this confirms what has already been said, that Echeverría is not much con-
cerned with understanding technoscience. Rather, based on his conviction that one of
the main consequences of technoscience has been the creation of “assessors and ex-
perts for the management of scientific policies as well as for evaluating science and
technology” (p. 204), he proposes the managerial hegemony of evaluation, which he
claims can provide the ground for upholding the pragmatic principle of strategic ac-
tion that considers that “technoscience is the source of economic, political and mili-
tary power” (p. 266). Echeverría is convinced that “the struggle for power” is the mo-
tor of contemporary technoscience, whether it be for military power to which big science
contributes, or for economic power to which the R&D&I departments of big corpora-
tions of the globalized economy contribute.
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